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Abstract
In addition to wireless telephony boom, a similar exponential increasing trend in wireless data
service -for example, short message service (SMS) – is visible as technology advances. We develop
a structural model to examine user demand for voice and SMS services. Speciﬁcally, we measure
the own- and the cross-price elasticities of these services. The cross-price elasticity is of signiﬁcant
importance because marketing activities are critically inﬂuenced by whether the goods are substitutes
or complements. The research context poses signiﬁcant econometric challenges due to three-part
tariﬀs, and sequential discrete plan choice and continuous quantity choice decisions. Using detailed
individual consumption data of more than 6000 customers, we ﬁnd that SMS and voice services are
small substitutes. A 10% increase in the price of voice minutes will induce about 0.8% increase in
the demand for SMS. The own price elasticity of voice is also low, to the order of approximately -0.1.
Younger users’ demand is far more inelastic than that of older users. We then conduct counterfactual
policy experiments that fully capture the eﬀects of change in key parameters on the ﬁrm revenues.
Finally, we discuss the generalizability of our framework.
Keywords: Wireless communication, Price elasticity, Short Message Service (SMS), Structural
Model, nonlinear tariﬀ, substitutes vs complements, policy experiments.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, mobile (cellular) telephones have grown to be a central part of the telecommunication
network – mobile penetration rates exceed ﬁxed line penetration rates in all regions of the world, and
by a margin of three to four times in some regions.1 Along with the growth of mobile telephony, the
use of wireless data services - speciﬁcally Short Message Service (SMS) - has also grown exponentially.
The growth of mobile services has been even more spectacular in some of the less developed countries
in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Many users are giving up their traditional land lines and relying solely on
their cellular phones as a primary communication device. A recent McKinsey study ﬁnds that mobile
services have generated billions of dollars in consumer welfare (Enriquez et al. 2007). Currently, revenues
from mobile data services are about 15-20% of Average Revenues per User (ARPU). 2 However, going
forward it is expected that the mobile data will become a key revenue source for mobile operators. Most
cellular operators are betting on an increasing uptake of mobile data services and investing billions in
infrastructure. Despite tremendous growth in mobile voice and data services, our understanding of how
users consume these services is still limited. In particular, little work exists that examines the interaction
between voice and data services. In this paper, using a rich panel dataset, we estimate demand elasticities
for these services with a particular focus on the cross-price eﬀects of voice and SMS.
This study has important implications for practitioners and academicians. Wireless communication
tariﬀs tend to be highly nonlinear being composed of a ﬁxed fee component and a marginal fee compo-
nent. While these price schemes are intuitive to describe, an empirical estimation of demand parameters
under a nonlinear price structure is non-trivial. In particular, from an academic perspective one has to
carefully model user choices for both the service plan and then subsequent consumptions. For managers,
understanding user response to a typical nonlinear pricing scheme is important because it allows them to
optimally price their products. For example, a manager might want to know how changes in the ﬁxed fee
or the marginal price would impact her ﬁrm proﬁtability. Similarly, the cross-price elasticity between two
services has important implications for optimal pricing and promotion decisions. For example, if man-
agers comprehend how voice and SMS interact (whether SMS is a substitute or a complement to voice),
they can better predict the direct and indirect impact of pricing and promotion and set appropriate
marketing strategies.
However, impact of SMS on voice (and vice-versa) is ambiguous. On the one hand, SMS can be a close
substitute of voice if it is perceived to serve the same purpose. In that case, a price increase in voice may
lead to increased usage of SMS (and vice-versa). However, SMS and voice serve may possibly diﬀerent
purposes and at best they are weak substitutes. Andersson et al. (2006) argue that SMS and voice may
even exhibit a complementary relationship. For example, a price decrease in SMS may lead to more
incoming messages for a user, who in turn may respond by increasing voice consumption. Given these
conjectures, how voice and SMS interact is an open empirical question. However, except for a couple
of recent papers which we describe in detail in the next section, the literature examining this mutual
relationship is sparse, presumably due to the lack of individual-level consumption data or relatively recent
nature of this phenomenon. Our study ﬁlls this gap in the literature. We have access to individual-level
consumption data for these services, which allows us to build a richer model and draw useful conclusions.
1http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/index.html
2http://www.comms-dealer.com/mobile-zone/latest-news/global-revenues-non-voice-services-hits-1887bn-2008; most of
the non-voice revenues is from SMS.
2
Besides the unique data set, our paper also makes important methodological contributions. As noted,
the telecom tariﬀs (especially in the wireless industry) tend to be two-part (or three-part) nonlinear tariﬀs
which require careful modeling to avoid bias in demand estimations. In our case, we not only have a
three-part tariﬀ structure with consumers’ sequential decisions (ﬁrst choosing a plan and then choosing
the consumption level), we also deal with a two goods problem - voice and SMS. In this paper, we oﬀer
a structural model by specifying a utility function and deriving the demand curves for these services.
This model allows us to jointly specify the sequential consumption decision at an individual user level
for these goods, and allows us to estimate the own and the cross-price elasticities for these services. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that oﬀers a methodology to estimate the own and the cross-price
elasticities for voice and SMS services based on a detailed individual-level consumption data. Another
advantage of the structural model is that it allows us to perform some policy experiments. Thus, with
our estimates, we can simulate and specify how changes in key strategic variables (e.g., ﬁxed fee, marginal
price etc.) would aﬀect the ﬁrm demand and revenues (or proﬁtability).
Our paper is composed of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we specify a utility structure and develop a
general model of individual consumption behavior in voice and SMS. In the second part, we estimate
our model using a real world data set, explicitly allowing for the cross-eﬀects and endogeneity in the
choice of plans and consumption levels. Our framework incorporates four crucial elements that could
aﬀect users’ optimal consumption behavior: (1) interrelationship of voice and SMS in demand through
the cross-price elasticities, (2) estimation of the own-price elasticities, (3) the service-speciﬁc satiation
points, and (4) potential for endogeneity through covariance between the voice and SMS satiation points.
The fourth point is critical. If users who consume large numbers of voice minutes are also likely to send
large numbers of SMS, the demand for the two services would be positively correlated even if the two
services are not complementary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a background on the relevant literature in
section 1.1. Our research context (data and pricing scheme) is provided and analyzed in section 2. We
outline our analytic model in section 3 and estimation strategy in section 4. In the subsequent section,
we discuss our results along with the policy experiments. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our
ﬁndings, limitation, and suggestions for future research.
1.1 Relevant Literature
The telecommunication demand modeling literature has a rich history (see Taylor 1994 for a summary).
Generally, the telecommunication pricing and consumption behavior has been an intriguing research
area because the industry has unique characteristics such as high ﬁxed costs, low short-run marginal
costs, and network externalities. These issues pose interesting econometric challenges. More importantly,
the telecommunication industry traditionally has been a regulated industry and much work has been
conducted to examine the impact of regulatory changes on user demand and social welfare.
The relevant telecommunication literature for our study can be classiﬁed into two research topics:
(1) evaluating the ﬁxed-line telecommunication demand structure, and (2) evaluating the mobile com-
munication demand. Many studies have estimated price elasticity of demand in various contexts for the
ﬁxed line telephony. Taylor and Kridel (1990) make a distinction between telephone access and telephone
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use while calculating the price elasticity of telephone demand. Distinguishing the use-based (metered)
and the ﬂat-rate pricing, some researchers investigate how users choose one over the other and how their
demand changes under these pricing regimes (Kling and Ploeg 1990; Park et al. 1983). Miravete (2002)
explicitly incorporates users’ uncertainty in the number of minutes demanded in the next month when
choosing a plan today. Most of the studies ﬁnd a low price elasticities for local voice services. Kling and
Ploeg (1990) estimate the elasticity to be on the order of -0.17 while Park et al.’s (1983) estimate is about
-0.1.
In the domain of wireless telephony, one main research stream has been to examine the penetration
of mobile services and how the mobile communication interacts with the ﬁxed line communication (Ahn
and Lee 1999; Hausman 1999; Rodini et al. 2003; Sung and Lee 2002). The results have been conﬂicting.
Some have found a substitution eﬀect between the ﬁxed lines and mobiles (Ahn and Lee 1999) while
others have found a complementary eﬀect (Gruber and Verboven 2001). More recently, Economides et
al. (2008) report that the ﬁxed line usage (in both local and regional services) for a household is greater
if the household owns a cellular phone and suggest that the cellular service proxies for the intensity of
household communication needs.
Another research stream has analyzed market structure, mark-ups and competition between mobile
providers. Hausman (1999) estimates the welfare impact of diﬀusion of cellular phones. Garbacz and
Thompson (2007) estimate demand for mobile services in developing countries. Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004)
develop a model of competition between the US cellular operators and recover key cost parameters from
aggregate demand data. Gruber (2001) analyzes how competition aﬀects diﬀusion of mobile services.
Much of the previous work analyzing mobile communication is focused only on the mobile voice service,
leaving out the data service such as SMS. For example, Iyengar (2004) uses individual-level data similar
to ours to estimate consumer demand but he does not have information on SMS usage. Given SMS’s wide
use, the interaction of voice and SMS provides an interesting and understudied area. Recently, two papers
have looked at the interaction between voice and SMS. Andersson et al. (2006) analyze relationship of
the two services in context of network size. They estimate the cross-price elasticity of voice and SMS and
show that, depending on the network size, the relationship could be either substitutive or complementary.
However, their data is highly aggregate. They use quarterly average SMS sent in Norway and use the
data over 33 quarters to estimate a reduced form model. Such a high level of aggregation precludes them
from modeling and interpreting user behavior at a micro-level. In a recent paper, Grzybowski and Periera
(2008) show that SMS and voice have a complementary relationship. While their data is at individual-
level, they do not observe the user’s plan choice and hence do not observe the marginal prices paid by the
user (or even the average price paid by the user). This again forces data aggregation. Our data is richer
in this regard as we can observe plan characteristics and consumers’ sequential choices (plan choice and
consumption) in detail. This allows us to build a more realistic model of the consumer decision making.
Our work is also closely related to the “multiple category purchasing behavior” line of research in
marketing discipline. Researchers have begun to understand cross-category relationships in consumers’
decision-making, using multi-category models (see Seetharaman et al. 2005 for a review of this topic). The
recognition of cross-category dependencies implies that a consumer’s purchase decisions across categories
are not independent. In other words, a consumer’s decision of whether or how much to buy in one
category depends on her corresponding decision in the related category (Chiang 1991; Niraj et al. 2005;
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Seetharaman et al. 2005; Song and Chintagunta 2007). In our setting, voice and SMS are two such
categories which impact the consumption decisions of each other.
We now provide some details on our data and outline key econometric challenges.
2 Research context
2.1 Data
We collected detailed consumption data on 6847 subscribers of a cellular service provider in an Asian
country (the operator was the third largest in the county with more than 2 million consumers at that
time) from April 2002 through December 2002. The ﬁrm oﬀers two kinds of communication services:
voice and SMS.3 We have the following consumption information at an individual level: (1) the voice
service use measured in the number of minutes for each consumer for each month, (2) the number of
SMS’s sent for each month, and (3) demographic information about the users (gender, age, and marital
status). Users select into ﬁve diﬀerent three-part tariﬀs oﬀered by the ﬁrm. The plan is selected at the
beginning of a month. Table 1 shows the pricing scheme oﬀered – the pricing scheme did not change
during our research period.
Plan # Fixed fee (units)∗ Free minutes Overtime charge of Charge of
voice service SMS service
1 350 350
3 units/min 3 units/message
2 800 517
3 1100 917
4 1500 1217
5 2000 2117
∗In currency units of the country
Table 1: Pricing Scheme (Three-part nonlinear Tariﬀ)
In Table 2, we oﬀer descriptive statistics of our sample. In particular, we show the consumption
statistics of voice and SMS across demographic characteristics and across ﬁve plans. The statistics
indicate that Plan 1 is heavily subscribed to. The user consumption seems to follow a reasonable pattern.
The consumption of both voice and SMS is fairly heterogenous. Younger users consumer higher volumes
of voice minutes as well as of SMS. Across the plans, as one moves from plan 1 to plan 5, the consumption
of both voice and SMS increases (except for the last plan when the consumption of SMS decreases). Recall
from Table 1 that the free minutes available increase as one moves from plan 1 to plan 5.
3Due to the disclosure agreement, name of the ﬁrm is not disclosed. The available data were from about 10,000 subscribers
for the whole 2002 year. However, the ﬁrst three months of the data were for trial period. About a third of the consumers
had signed for a “family plan” which was not speciﬁc to an individual. So we dropped those observations. Some observations
were dropped when we did not have good demographic information on users. We also dropped those months of data when
the users used fewer than 10 minutes of voice. This led to a ﬁnal sample of about 6847 consumers for a total of 59866
observations.
5
Whole Sample
Mean S.D. Min Max N
Voice 281.3 252.6 10.1 11845.3
59866SMS 11.8 34.2 0 3106
Users with Age<30
Voice 329.8 299.5 10.2 11845.3
22483SMS 16.7 36.7 0 1558
30 ≤Age<40
Voice 265.0965 223.455 10.08 6602.36
29520SMS 9.232893 33.69502 0 3106
Age≥40
Voice 203.6786 168.1059 10.05 2916.9
7863SMS 7.315656 26.84394 0 1079
Female
Voice 287.1297 257.9581 10.08 11845.31
32592SMS 13.19011 31.63919 0 1558
Male
Voice 274.3871 246.0002 10.05 6602.36
27274SMS 10.14611 37.10299 0 3106
Plan 1
Voice 248.9897 167.7135 10.05 2887.17
56634SMS 10.17615 31.56993 0 3106
Plan 2
Voice 642.5653 316.8856 19.62 4612.55
2103SMS 39.08512 59.03361 0 932
Plan 3
Voice 1011.397 505.8127 53.23 5169.68
750SMS 44.27733 60.24948 0 633
Plan 4
Voice 1556.421 994.3582 168.72 11845.31
286SMS 43.13287 54.75447 0 562
Plan 5
Voice 1994.418 889.3416 429.6 4334.71
93SMS 27.53763 41.02427 0 188
Voice is measured in the amount of minutes consumed per month
SMS is measured in the number of messages per month
Table 2: Average usage statistics
2.2 One-side and ‘step’ nonlinear pricing
Since the ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of three-part tariﬀs (second-degree price discrimination), consumer budget
constraints are characterized not only by quantities consumed but also by the selected plan (which6
determines the amount of ﬁxed fee to be paid). In our case, while the quantity of voice service is
continuous, the quantity discount is discrete because users realize the beneﬁt of nonlinear pricing only by
choosing a higher plan. Here we will call it ‘step’ nonlinear pricing. By contrast, SMS service is sold on
a ﬂat, metered basis (linear pricing). Thus the pricing is ‘one-side’ nonlinear pricing. This ‘one-side’ and
‘step’ nonlinear pricing aﬀects consumer utility maximization by generating unique budget constraints as
shown in Figure 1. X-axis is the expenditure on SMS and y-axis is the expenditure on voice. The budget
line is kinked. Consider a user with the budget constraint of 2000 units (enough to select plan 5). The
user can choose plan 5, which will give her 2117 free minutes. Then the user can not consume any SMS
as it will exceed the given budget. If the user wants to consume SMS, the user needs to move to a lower
plan and save some money for SMS consumption, hence the vertical downward shift in the budget line
leading to a kink.
Under the same budget, every plan is characterized by distinctive areas indicating available amounts
in voice and SMS. In Figure 1, the shaded area under the budget line shows the feasible selection area of
voice and SMS within the chosen plan. To choose the optimal mix of voice and SMS, consumers search
for the highest indiﬀerence curve which touches the feasible set. The graph draws the indiﬀerence curve
of one consumer who chooses plan 1 and an another consumer who chooses plan 3 which maximize their
utility, respectively. In our fully articulated model described below, the total amount spent on voice plus
SMS is endogenously chosen by the consumer.
This kinked budget line is consistent with the nonlinear pricing models (Moﬃtt 1990) and leads to an
interesting and unusual structure to the budget set, which complicates our estimation task but enables
us to identify our model as we explain later.
SMS
Unique feasible area if plan 4 is selected
Unique feasible area if plan 5 is selected
Plan 1 is the optimal plan choice for this budget curve 
Plan 3 is the optimal plan choice for this budget curve 
Voice 
Figure 1: Feasible area conditional on a voice plan and optimal plan choice
3 Econometric model
3.1 Conceptual background
In case of many goods, a change in price of a good induces income and substitution eﬀects that aﬀect the
demand for the other goods. Two goods are Marshallian substitutes, if a price increase in one increases
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demand for the other. On the other hand, the goods are complements if a price increase in one decreases
demand for the other good.
To prove that two goods are complements, one cannot simply show that their consumptions positively
co-vary. That is, if we ﬁnd that high voice users also tend to be high SMS users, this does not imply
that they are complements. Two goods are complements if an increase of price in one yields a reduction
in demand for the other. As pointed out by Manchanda et al. (1999), multiple categories can be bought
together on one shopping trip due to: (1) complementarity (or cross eﬀect), (2) consumer heterogeneity,
and (3) co-incidence. Since the main focus of this study is to examine cross eﬀect, we need to control
the other two confounders, heterogeneity and co-incidence. To control for heterogeneity in inherent
preferences for voice and SMS, we allow user types (as determined by the preferences for both services)
to follow a probability distribution (discussed later). We also let the preferences for voice and SMS to
co-vary to account for preference homogeneity. Furthermore, we use a user demographic proﬁle to account
for the remaining consumer heterogeneity. The varieties of co-incidence which are most likely to apply
(e.g., habit persistence) can also be accommodated within the correlated user type (or equivalently via
the satiation points) as we model below.
3.2 Analytical framework
Our analytical model is based on (discrete) plan choice and (continuous) consumed quantities across
two services under the given one-side and ‘step’ nonlinear pricing. Consumers are assumed to maximize
utility by making two decisions at diﬀerent points on the time horizon. The consumer makes a plan
choice decision among discrete alternatives at the ﬁrst stage. This choice is based on the expected
optimal consumption bundle. The consumer decides continuous quantities of service usage in the second
stage. As a result, the analytic framework takes the form of a two-stage discrete/continuous mixture
choice model.
The important early papers, that lay the blueprint for these modeling contexts, use discrete choice
models such as logit and probit (e.g., Albert and Chib 1993) or the multinomial brand choice models
(e.g., Rossi et al. 1996). But the continuous quantity decision at the second stage may not be addressed
well by the (nested) logit model as transforming continuous variables into discrete variable causes loss
of information (Niraj et al. 2005). Similarly, the approach to treat diﬀerent combinations – three
element vectors of discrete plan choice and two continuous consumptions in our context – as diﬀerent
multinomial choice alternatives leads to immense numbers of alternatives making multinomial choice
unviable. Hanemann et al.(1984) develop a uniﬁed framework for formulating econometric models of
discrete/continuous choices in which both discrete and continuous choices aim at the same underlying
utility maximization decision. But, in their model, the alternatives for discrete choices are essentially
(perfect or near perfect) substitutes and thus a consumer prefers to buy only one option (e.g., brand A over
brand B, C, and D) at any time and the continuous choice is the magnitude of the option chosen. However,
in our context, the assumption that only one alternative has to be selected on a discrete choice occasion
is not appropriate, because the majority of consumers select both services simultaneously. Finally and
more importantly, given that both services are selected in a mixed discrete/continuous context, separate
modeling of the two decisions – using a logit model for the discrete choice and regression models for
the continuous decision – is incorrect due to the endogeneity problem (ultimately causing ineﬃcient
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estimation or the omitted variable problem) if the quantity decision is not statistically independent of
the choice decision and vice versa.4
In our context, we deal with the two goods problem, while the literature has focused on one good. It
is obvious that the two decisions (which plan to select and how many minutes in voice and how many
messages in SMS to use) are statistically dependent. This violates the basic assumption of the two-step
approach (limited information MLE). So we have to estimate the model with full information MLE. In
the following, we derive the joint likelihood function for the observed consumption data from general
distributional assumptions regarding consumer heterogeneity and random error terms.
3.3 User utility speciﬁcation
Since the paper contains large number of notations, for readability we ﬁrst provide a table with notations.
We will continue to refer to Table 3 throughout.
index i, k, t i represents a user, k represents a plan, and t represents time (month).
qikt Number of voice minutes consumed by user i under plan k during month t.
sikt Number of SMS sent by user i under plan k during month t.
FQk Number of free quota minutes provided in plan k.
Tk Fixed fee to enrol in plan k.
yit Normalized outside good consumed by user i during month t.
Iit Income of user i during month t.
θiqt, θist User types indicating user i’s inherent preference for voice and SMS services
during month t.
μq, σq Estimated mean and standard deviation of θiqt.
μs, σs Estimated mean and standard deviation of θist.
ρ Correlation in preference for voice and SMS.
pq Marginal price of voice minute after free quota is exceeded.
ps Marginal price of each SMS.
εqikt, ε
s
ikt Error terms that captures the diﬀerence between expected and actual consump-
tion of voice and SMS.
σεq, σεs Estimated variance of the error terms above.
bq, bs Estimated price response parameters for voice and SMS.
bint Estimated parameter indicating impact of voice consumption on SMS consump-
tion.
PBCk Plan Boundary Curve: Indiﬀerence curve that separates plan k− 1 from plan k.
Users below PCBk choose plan k.
FQCk Free Quota Curve: Indiﬀerence curve that separates satiated users from rest.
Users below FQCk are satiated and do not expect to use marginal minutes.
While users above the curve are either at the kink or use marginal minutes.
MMCk Marginal Minutes Curve: Indiﬀerence curve that separates the users exceed-
ing free quota minutes from the rest. Users above MMCk are expected to use
marginal minutes while users below the curve are either at the kink or satiated.
Table 3: Notations used in the paper
We consider individuals indexed by i =1,2,. . . ,N. The individuals choose a plan from the set of
available plans, indexed by k =1,2,. . . ,5 over time t =1,2,. . . ,T. They then choose continuous quantities
4To solve the problem of the two-step approach, Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988) ﬁrst estimate the choice model with a
discrete choice model and then estimate the regression model based on the parameters estimated after correcting selection
bias. But, their research context is also about choice of one brand and its subsequent consumption.
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of voice qikt and SMS sikt, conditional on the plan choice. When a user selects plan k, the user must pay
a ﬁxed fee Tk to sign up for the plan, and is allowed to use a free quota of voice minutes FQk. Once the
user exceeds the free quota, she has to incur a marginal cost, pq per minute for voice. Thus, each plan is
a three-part tariﬀ that can be characterized by Tk and FQk. Users always pay the marginal price ps for
each SMS. We assume that the consumers spend the remainder of their income on an outside good yi at
a normalized unit price.
We assume that the utility obtained by an individual i from selecting plan k and consuming (qikt,sikt)
of voice and SMS is quadratic in quantities consumed. The utility structure is of the form:
Uikt(qikt, sikt, yit|θiqt, θist, bq, bs, bint) = 1
bq
(
θiqtqikt − q
2
ikt
2
)
+
1
bs
(
θistsikt − s
2
ikt
2
)
+ bintqiktsikt + yit
bq, bs, θiqt, θist ≥ 0 (1)
The quadratic utility structure is widely modeled in the telecommunication demand literature (Econo-
mides et al. 2008; Miravete et al. 2004). Note that the utility function is quasi-linear in the outside good
so that the choice of plan and consumption do not depend on income. In short, we assume that while
change in price will induce both substitution (or complementary) and income eﬀect, the income eﬀect is
negligible. This assumption is reasonable and widely used since a relatively small portion of income is
assigned to the telephony services (Park et al 1983, footnote 5; Economides et al. 2008).5 Low income
eﬀects are highlighted in many other goods as well (see Tammo et al 2005). Though it must be stressed
that unavailability of income data is a limitation of our analysis.
In Equation (1), the ﬁrst term represents utility from voice consumption, the second term represents
utility from SMS consumption, and the fourth term captures utility from outside goods. As is commonly
done, we assume that the utility from outside goods and the utility from mobile services are separable.
Thus consumption in mobile services does not aﬀect the marginal utility obtained from the outside good
and vice-versa.6 However, utilities from voice and SMS services are inseparable. Thus, a change in
consumption of one service can inﬂuence consumption of the other service. This interaction is modeled
through the third term in Equation (1) and bint captures the substitutive eﬀect (if negative), or the
complementary eﬀect (if positive), or no eﬀect (if zero). Thus our speciﬁcation is very ﬂexible. Our
utility structure assumes diminishing marginal utility of voice and SMS services and is the same for all
users.7
bq and bs represent price response parameters, respectively, which can be used to calculate the own
and the cross-price elasticity. (θiqt, θist) represents a user’s inherent preference for two services and varies
across users. Higher values of (θiqt, θist) represent higher preference for the services. (θiqt, θist) is closely
related to the concept of consumer satiation point – the maximum consumption level desired for a good
at any price (consumers will never demand more than the satiation point, even if the price is zero).8 The
5In our setting, most users spend less than 0.3% of their average per capita income on monthly cellular tariﬀs.
6Some utility from outside goods (e.g., ﬁxed phone service and broadband services) might be dependent on wireless
services. However the portion of utility from ﬁxed phone service and broadband services is very small (or negligible) as
compared to the utility from all other human activity and there is no evidence of a consistent relationship between them.
7The second derivative of the utility function with respect to q and s is negative.
8The satiation points are (
θiq+bintbqθist
1−b2intbsbq
,
θis+bintbsθiq
1−b2intbsbq
). The satiation point is composed of three parameters to be es-
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notion of satiation point is widely modeled in the telecommunication demand literature (Economides et
al. 2008; Miravete et al. 2004; Kling and Ploeg 1990). Notice that we allow the satiation points to vary
over time, which is consistent with variation in consumption across time for a user.
Consumers ﬁrst choose a plan and then choose quantities for voice and SMS. We solve the problem with
backward induction, starting with the second stage where an individual user selects optimal quantities
for voice and SMS, conditional on the plan choice k in the ﬁrst stage, subject to the budget constraint
Iit :
Iit ≥ Tk + pq(qikt − FQk)+ + pssikt + yit
where
(qikt − FQk)+ =
⎧⎨
⎩ qikt − FQk if qikt > FQk0 if qikt ≤ FQk (2)
Equation (2) indicates that the marginal price of voice kicks in only if the free quota of minutes is
exceeded. Substituting the budget constraint into utility maximization objective function yields:
Max
qikt,sikt
Uikt(qikt, sikt|k) = 1
bq
(
θiqtqikt − q
2
ikt
2
)
+
1
bs
(
θistsikt − s
2
ikt
2
)
+ bintqiktsikt + Ii − Tk
−pq(qikt − FQk)+ − pssikt
The ﬁrst order condition is:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂Uikt
∂qikt
= θiqt−qiktbq + bintsikt − pq = 0 if qikt > FQk
∂Uikt
∂qikt
= θiqt−qiktbq + bintsikt = 0 if qikt ≤ FQk
and,
∂Uikt
∂sikt
=
θist − sikt
bs
+ bintqikt − ps = 0
Solving these simultaneously yields following demand equations.
(qikt, sikt)bint=0 =
⎛
⎝ (θiqt − bqpq , θist − bsps) if qikt > FQk
(θiqt, θist − bsps) if qikt ≤ FQk
(3)
(qikt, sikt)∗bint =0 =
⎛
⎝ (θiqt − bqpq + bqbintsikt , θist − bsps + bsbintqikt) if qikt > FQk
(θiqt + bqbintsikt, θist − bsps + bsbintqikt) if qikt ≤ FQk
(4)
timated and a consumer type. If there is no cross eﬀect (bint = 0), (θiqt, θist) is individual i’s satiation points. Due to
interaction, the satiation point in SMS service aﬀects a satiation point in voice service and vice versa. The mutual inﬂuence
of the cross eﬀect on satiation points critically depends on the sign of bint.
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Equations (3) and (4) present the demand curves for voice and SMS services, in the absence and
presence of the cross eﬀects respectively. They show that the optimal bundle in one service shifts due
to consumption level of the other service reﬂecting the interaction eﬀect of two services. Therefore,
comparison of the consumption bundles of two services when there is no cross eﬀect and when there is
a cross eﬀect, enables us to see the impact of the cross eﬀect on usage level as well as how to intuitively
interpret bint embedded in the interaction term.
Middle point in Figure 2 is the optimal consumption when there is no interaction between voice and
SMS (bint = 0). The consumption bundle can move to one of the four directions on two dimensions of
qikt and sikt when bint = 0 (see Figure 2) – i.e., the comparison of Equation (3) and Equation (4) presents
four possible scenarios regarding the change of optimal consumption bundle of voice and SMS.
If the interaction eﬀect exists, we can intuitively divide it into two groups – the symmetric scenario (1
and 3) vs. the asymmetric scenario (2 and 4). Given the deﬁnition and the utility speciﬁcation, the cross
eﬀect must be symmetric, whatever its direction is: increasing in scenario (1) or decreasing in scenario
(3).9 Because bq, bs, qikt, andsikt are positive, the direction of the change depends on the sign of bint
(positive or negative). In scenario 1 (bint > 0), consumption in one service induces more consumption in
other service. As a result, positive bint provides evidence that one service plays a role of complementing
the other service. In scenario 3 (bint < 0), voice service is a substitute for SMS service and vice versa.
Consequently, the role of bint is clear: presence or absence of bint as well as its sign captures potential
interaction eﬀect of these two services.
qik
Scenario 1 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Scenario 2 
sik
(qikt, sikt)* when bint = 0 
(qikt, sikt)* when bint  0 
Figure 2: The satiation points and the cross eﬀect
3.4 Demand function
Due to the nonlinearities of three-part tariﬀs, the demand functions need close inspection. In particular,
there are three distinct possibilities – (i) a user’s satiation point is less than the free quota, (ii) the
satiation point is more than the free quota but the marginal price is high enough that the user does not
9Given our utility function, this symmetry can be shown by Young’s theorem: ∂U
∂qikt∂sikt
is constant.
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want to exceed the free quota minutes, and (iii) the satiation point is high enough that the user consumes
marginal minutes.
Thus within each plan, a user can be in three diﬀerent regions (R1k, R
2
k, R
3
k) depending on their type
(θiqt, θist). These regions are characterized by indiﬀerence curves, PBC k, FQC k, and MMC k which are
derived in detail in the next section. These indiﬀerence curves are the threshold values of (θiqt, θist)
which separate users in diﬀerent regions. Figure 3 explains these regions more intuitively. We draw these
for plan 1 and 2. The rest are analogous. PBCk (Plan Boundary Curve) curve separates plan k from
plan k + 1. Notice that PBC 1 separates plan 1 from plan 2. So there are four PBC curves. PBC 0
is simply (θiqt = 0, θist = 0). FQC (Free Quota Curve) and MMC (Marginal Minute Curve) are the
indiﬀerence curves that separate the regions within a plan. FQC separates the users who are satiated
from the users who are at the kink. Thus the users between PBC 0 and FQC 1 (R11) are satiated. Similarly,
MMC separates the users who are at the kink from the users who are willing to use marginal minutes
by exceeding the free quota. Thus users between FQC 1 and MMC 1 (R21) are at the kink and the users
between MMC 1 and PBC 1 (R31) are using marginal minutes.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
plan 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
plan 2
PBC 0 FQC 1 MMC 1 PBC 1 FQC 2 MMC 2 PBC 2
R11 R
2
1 R
3
1 R
1
2 R
2
2 R
3
2
Figure 3: Diﬀerent regions across and within plans
More formally, the demand curve within each region can be derived from Equation (3) and (4).
if PBCk−1 ≤ (θiqt, θist) < FQCk⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
qikt =
θiqt+bintbqθist−bintbqbsps
1−b2intbsbq
sikt =
θist+bintbsθiqt−bsps
1−b2intbsbq
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−R1k
if FQCk ≤ (θiqt, θist) < MMCk⎧⎨
⎩ qikt = FQksikt = θist + bintbsFQk − bsps −−−−−−−−−−−−−−R2k
if MMCk ≤ (θiqt, θist) < PBCk⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
qikt =
θiqt+bintbqθist−bintbqbsps−bqpq
1−b2intbsbq
sikt =
θist+bintbsθiqt−bintbqbspq−bsps
1−b2intbsbq
−−−−−−−−−−−−−R3k
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5)
where
PBCk = {(θiqt, θist|k)|U∗(R3k|k) = U∗(R1k|k + 1)}
FQCk = {(θiqt, θist|k)|U∗(R1k|k) = U∗(R2k|k)}
MMCk = {(θiqt, θist|k)|U∗(R2k|k) = U∗(R3k|k)}
As noted above, the demand in R1k : (PBCk−1, FQCk) is for the users who are satiated, R
2
k :
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(FQCk,MMUk) is when users are at the kink and R3k : (MMUk, PBCk) is when users are using marginal
minutes.
3.5 User heterogeneity and indiﬀerence curves
These indiﬀerence curves are derived by comparing the utilities after plugging the optimal (q∗ikt, s
∗
ikt) from
Equation (5) into the utility function in Equation (1). It should be noted that the optimal consumptions
in these two services are determined simultaneously.
We show that all users whose (θiqt, θist) belongs to Rk: (PBC k−1, PBC k) select plan k. As the
ﬁrst step in deriving PBC k, we classify users into 5 groups, which is equivalent to the number of plans
available. The next axioms outline user heterogeneity based on their plan choice:
Axiom 1. If a user is indiﬀerent between two plans (plan k and plan k + 1), the cost of plan k (“the
ﬁxed fee of plan k” + “the variable cost depending on additional usage beyond the free minutes of plan
k”) and the cost of plan k+1 (only the ﬁxed fee of plan k+1) have to be identical, at the expected optimal
consumption point in voice service.10 As a result, a consumer with higher θiqt will choose a higher value
plan in order to realize beneﬁts of nonlinear pricing scheme. Thus, the ranking of plans is monotone in
θiqt.
Axiom 2. Even if the marginal cost of SMS service (ps) is identical regardless of plan choice, the plan
choice is aﬀected by θist due to the interaction. The expected optimal consumption of SMS is monotone
transformation of θiqt, which is monotone in plan choice. Therefore, the ranking of plans is monotone in
θist as well.
Axiom 3. From Axiom 1 and 2, the plan choice is ordered in θiqt and θist, despite one-side nonlinear
pricing. That is, the next equation always holds: Rk = {(θiqt, θist)|Uik ≥ Uij , ∀j = k} = {(θiqt, θist)|Uik ≥
Uik+1 & Uik ≥ Uik−1|k ≥ 2, Uik ≥ Uik+1|k = 1}, where Rk indicates (PBCk−1, PBCk).
Axiom 4. The indiﬀerence curve between plan k and plan k+1 can be computed by comparing utilities
generated from two plans: PBCk = {(θiqt, θist|k)|U∗(R3k|k) = U∗(R1k|k + 1)}.
Axiom 5. The shape of indiﬀerence curves (here, the slope of indiﬀerence lines) is identical across plans
under the assumption that the utility function is homothetic.
Axiom 6. Because the indiﬀerence curves do not overlap one another, indiﬀerence lines from the formula
in Axiom 4 will be the boundaries dividing ﬁve plans.
Comparing the indirect utility functions across ﬁve plans, we can compute the indiﬀerence curves
separating the two adjoining plans (From Axiom 4). The indiﬀerence curves are given by:
PBCk : θist =(
2FQkpq − 2b2intbqbsFQkpq + bqp2q + 2bintbqbspqps − 2Tk + 2b2intbqbsTk + 2Tk+1 − 2b2intbqbsTk+1
)
2bintbqpq
− θiqt
bintbq
10the actual consumption may diﬀer from the optimal consumption due to some random shocks of zero mean. However,
user can optimize plans choice only the basis of expected optimal consumption
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We can see that the indiﬀerence curve is aﬀected by (Tk, FQk, pq, and ps), and (bq, bs, and bint).
From Axiom 5, all indiﬀerence curves have the same slope, -1/(bqbint). The interpretation of the slope is
identical to the interpretation of bint as we described in section 3.2 : a positive value of bint indicates a
substitutive relationship and a negative value complementary relationship.
As numerical illustration, we plug real numbers from our data in this equation to derive the indiﬀerence
curve separating plan 1 and plan 2, PBC 1:
PBC1 : θist =
1000 + 3bq + 6bintbqbs − 1000b2intbqbs
2bintbq
− θiqt
bintbq
FQC k and MMC k can be derived in the similar way. Plugging the optimal (qikt, sikt) from R1k and R
2
k
into the indirect utility function would yield FQC k and the optimal (qik, sik) from R2k and R
3
k will yield
MMC k.
FQC k : θist =
FQk + 3bintbqbs − FQkb2intbqbs
bintbq
− θiqt
bintbq
MMC k : θist =
FQk + 3bq + 3bintbqbs − FQkb2intbqbs
bintbq
− θiqt
bintbq
4 Model Estimation
To operationalize the theoretical model, we derive a joint likelihood function. First, we formulate the
probability of choosing a plan k and then the probability of observing the actual consumption bundle
(qikt,sikt) conditional on the plan choice.
4.1 Probability of choosing a plan k
We calculate the probability of an individual i choosing a plan k from the fact that the individual
chooses the plan that maximizes her utility conditional on the expected future consumptions (not real
consumption) derived from (θiqt, θist) and (bq, bs, and bint).11 The parameters (bq, bs, and bint) are to be
estimated, whereas (θiqt,θist) is not observed by econometricians. We make a distributional assumption
on unobserved user types (user heterogeneity).
We assume that the distribution of the user type, f(θiqt, θist), follows a truncated bivariate normal
distribution:
⎛
⎝ θiqt
θist
⎞
⎠ ∼ TBN (μ,∑) , μ =
⎛
⎝ μq
μs
⎞
⎠ ,∑ =
⎛
⎝ σ2q ρσqσs
ρσqσs σ
2
s
⎞
⎠.
Since the satiation point can never be less than zero, a truncated distribution is appropriate. Moreover,
normal distribution is very ﬂexible and tractable. We assume that (θiqt, θist) follow a joint normal
distribution rather than independent normal distributions – i.e., we allow ρ to capture the unobserved
inherent association of two service consumptions, θiqt and θist. Thus, ρ > 0 indicates that the preference
11After selecting plan k, they cannot change the plan during the month.
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for voice service is positively correlated with that for SMS. The assumption of a joint distribution allows
us to examine the cross eﬀect by excluding the impact of inherent association (Manchanda et al. 1999).
The structural parameters to be estimated are (bq, bs, and bint), the means of the distribution (μq and
μs), the variances (σq and σs), and the correlation (ρ).
Given the distributional assumption, we can write the probability of a consumer choosing plan:
Prikt = Pr(plan = k|θiqt, θist) =
∫ ∫
Rk
f(θiqt, θist)dθiqtdθist, (6)
where
f(θiqt, θist) =
e−
Q
2
/
2πσqσs
√
1−ρ2
1−R 0−∞
R 0
−∞ f(θiqt,θist)dθiqtdθist
, Q = 11−ρ2
[
(θiqt−μq)2
σ2q
− 2ρ (θiqt−μq)(θist−μs)σqσs +
(θist−μs)2
σ2s
]
Rk =
(
PBCk−1, PBCk
)
4.2 Probability of consumption conditional on plan choice
In the second stage, users select a consumption bundle of voice and SMS. However, the actual demand
observed would not be equal to the expected demand derived from Equation (5). The diﬀerence be-
tween the “actual” consumption and the “expected” consumption occurs due to unobserved noise that is
unanticipated by consumers. Thus, the diﬀerence reﬂects a random shock (or measurement error) a user
may experience in a given month. For the empirical estimation, we add an error term in the demand
function as an additive form following Burtless and Hausman’s (1978) approach. Absent an error term,
all consumers in the R2k region would always cluster at the kink – a fact that is inconsistent with the
data. Thus the realized demand is, qikt = E(qikt) + ε
q
ikt, where the expected demand E(qikt), is derived
in Equation (5). The SMS demand curve is derived analogously. We assume that the distribution of error
terms, h
(
εqikt, ε
s
ikt
)
, follows the independent bivariate normal distribution:
⎡
⎣ εqikt
εsikt
⎤
⎦ ∼ BV N
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝ 0
0
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ σ2εq 0
0 σ2εs
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎟⎠.
Assuming f(θiqt, θist) and h(ε
q
ikt, ε
s
ikt) are stochastically independent, probability of observing the
consumption depends on plan choice k, and the region Rk within the plan. Recall from Figure 3 that
a user could be satiated, at the kink, or using marginal minutes. Therefore probability of observing
(qikt, sikt) conditional on plan k is
g(qikt, sikt|k) =
∫ ∫
R1k
h(εqikt, ε
s
ikt)dF +
∫ ∫
R2k
h(εqikt, ε
s
ikt)dF +
∫ ∫
R3k
h(εqikt, ε
s
ikt)dF∫ ∫
Rk
dF
(7)
where dF = f(θiqt, θist)dθiqtdθist. Regions Rk are as deﬁned previously.
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4.3 Joint likelihood function
Now we can derive the joint distribution of a user i choosing a plan k and then choosing (qikt,sikt)
conditional on user type. The joint likelihood function for a user i is Prikt(k|•)× gikt(qikt, sikt|•, k). The
likelihood function across both individual i and time t is:
L =
∏
i
∏
t
(
Prikt(•)× gikt(•)
)
=
∏
i
∏
t
(∫ ∫
Rk
h(εqikt, ε
s
ikt)f(θiqt, θist)dθiqtdθist
) (8)
Any statistical or econometric model makes an important trade-oﬀ between “an analytically tractable,
but parametrically restrictive speciﬁcation” and “analytically complicated, but parametrically ﬂexible
speciﬁcation” (Seetharaman et al. 2005). In the similar vein, our formulation also imposes two nonlinear
constraints derived from the concavity condition of utility function and from the condition of monotone
ordering of indiﬀerence curves:
(i) 0 < b2intbsbq < 1
(ii) bq < 343 (1− b2intbsbq)
We cannot obtain closed form expression for the joint likelihood function. Thus we need to compute
it numerically. We estimated the model in two ways: (1) maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with
direct numerical approximation (quadrature integration) and (2) maximum simulated likelihood estima-
tion (MSLE) using Monte Carlo methods. MLE imposes a signiﬁcant computational burden involved
in numerical integration restricting the sample size. MSLE on the other hand places less computational
burden and, hence, we report the estimates from MSLE. For MSLE, we selected f(θiqt, θist) as an impor-
tance function. The simulated log-likelihood function is the average value of the function of h(εqikt, ε
s
ikt)
over the importance function. We thus maximize the simulated log-likelihood function subject to the
constraints:
lnL ≈
∑
i,t
ln
(
Eh(εqikt,εsikt)
[
Tr × f
(
θiqt, θist
)])
(9)
In Equation (9), Tr is a truncation compensation factor. To sample from a bivariate normal distribu-
tion of (θrngiqt , θ
rng
ist ), we began with draws from two standard normal distributions of (e
rng
1 , e
rng
2 ) and then
used the Cholesky decomposition to transform the random variables. By matrix algebra, it is possible to
decompose the bivariate normal distribution in the following way,⎛
⎝ θrngiqt
θrngist
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ μq
μs
⎞
⎠+
⎛
⎝ σq(√1−ρ2) σqρ
0 σs
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ erng1
erng2
⎞
⎠
When we maximized the simulated log-likelihood, we used the same set of random draws for every
computation in order to achieve continuity (1000 draws). That is, each observation has its own unchanging
vector of 1000 draws. We used the BHHH (outer product of gradients) estimator to compute asymptotic
covariance matrix of the simulated maximum likelihood estimator.
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4.4 Identiﬁcation Issues
As the three choice decisions, [(k), (qikt,sikt)] are the consequences of a single utility maximization for an
individual; the model ensures that these decisions provide, in combination, the greatest possible utility
to the individual. The parameters to be estimated in this study are grouped into two categories: (1)
three structural parameters embedded in the utility function (bq, bs and bint) and, (2) distribution-related
parameter groups consisting of (μq, μs, σq, σs, and ρ) for the user type distribution, and (σεq and σεs)
for the measurement error distribution.
First, note that all distributional parameters are readily identiﬁed due to the systematic variation
in plan choices and consumptions across individuals. The mean value of voice (μq) and SMS (μs) with
associated variance σq and σs are identiﬁed due to variation in consumption across users and time. σεq
and σεs are identiﬁed due to diﬀerences in expected and actual consumption. Analogously ρ is identiﬁed.
The key price response parameters need closer examination. bq (price response parameter to voice
service) is readily identiﬁed as users face diﬀerent marginal prices depending on whether they are satiated
or not. In particular, consider a user type θˆiqt who is indiﬀerent between plan k and plan k + 1. In plan
k, the user is using marginal minutes while in plan k+1, the user is satiated. Thus, for a slight variation
around such a θˆiqt, the user faces diﬀerent marginal costs aﬀecting her voice consumption (a user of type
θˆiqt−  is using marginal minutes while a user of type θˆiqt +  is satiated, leading to diﬀerent consumption
amount by potentially the same θˆiqt type). By analogy, bq is also identiﬁed oﬀ the kinks within a plan
(recall three diﬀerent regions, (R1k, R
2
k, R
3
k) within a plan force a user to face diﬀerent price schedule).
In contrast, bs is not directly identiﬁed because there is no change in SMS pricing – the marginal cost
of SMS service is constant even around the kinked budget constraint. However, variation in the price
of voice minutes should impact SMS consumption through the hypothesized cross eﬀect and thus bs
is (indirectly) identiﬁable. Our key parameter of interest bint is identiﬁed through changes in marginal
prices for voice as explained above. Moreover, whenever a user exceeds her free quota limits, her marginal
price of voice changes from 0 to 3. This change in voice price provides an opportunity to identify how
SMS consumption changes. Since identiﬁcation of bint is key to our paper, we explain in more intuitive
detail how bint is potentially identiﬁed in section 5.2. It is noticeable that the key parameters (bq,bs and
bint) are simultaneously estimated not just through likelihood maximization but also the unique pricing
scheme causing the kinked budget constraint.
5 Result and Discussion
The estimation results by maximizing Equation (9) are given in Table 4. We estimate the model with
a full sample, and then split it along some demographic variables. The ﬁrst three rows are the key
structural parameters and the rest are the estimates for distributional parameters.
We ﬁrst focus on the distributional parameters (row 4 and below). Most of these estimates are
consistent with our data. For example, μq and μs capture the mean voice and SMS consumptions which
match well with the means reported in summary statistics in Table 2. These parameters are estimated
precisely. σεq and σεs capture measurement error and these estimates are fairly high suggesting that the
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Whole
sample
Users with
Age<30 30≤Age<40 Age≥40 Female Male
bint -0.35∗∗
(0.07)
-0.53∗∗
(0.11)
-0.48∗∗
(0.05)
-0.38∗∗
(0.07)
-0.59∗∗
(0.19)
-0.33∗∗
(0.03)
bq 7.22∗∗
(1.11)
5.27∗∗
(0.80)
8.53∗∗
(0.68)
9.24∗∗
(1.12)
7.31∗∗
(2.32)
8.51∗∗
(0.55)
bs 0.12∗∗
(0.02)
0.06∗∗
(0.01)
0.08∗∗
(0.01)
0.12∗∗
(0.02)
0.04∗∗
(0.01)
0.10∗∗
(0.01)
μq 283.11∗∗
(1.26)
334.07∗∗
(2.35)
272.81∗∗
(1.14)
208.61∗∗
(2.76)
290.01∗∗
(1.54)
279.80∗∗
(1.40)
μs 11.58∗∗
(0.27)
17.41∗∗
(0.31)
10.49∗∗
(0.73)
9.97∗∗
(0.47)
15.24∗∗
(0.25)
10.57∗∗
(0.21)
σq 134.82∗∗
(1.03)
161.72∗∗
(5.29)
147.39∗∗
(5.17)
148.60∗∗
(2.95)
136.75∗∗
(2.06)
132.75∗∗
(1.19)
σs 23.03∗∗
(0.11)
26.52∗∗
(0.09)
17.37∗∗
(0.18)
18.08∗∗
(0.29)
22.44∗∗
(0.05)
18.97∗∗
(0.05)
σεq 200.45∗∗
(0.14)
214.95∗∗
(0.15)
165.30∗∗
(0.24)
155.01∗∗
(0.44)
174.13∗∗
(0.06)
192.75∗∗
(0.12)
σεs 17.83∗∗
(0.003)
21.97∗∗
(0.01)
11.58∗∗
(0.003)
14.24∗∗
(0.01)
17.12∗∗
(0.004)
15.27∗∗
(0.003)
ρ 0.83∗∗
(0.01)
0.84∗∗
(0.02)
0.89∗∗
(0.01)
0.63∗∗
(0.02)
0.85∗∗
(0.01)
0.71∗∗
(0.01)
N 59,866 22483 29,520 7,863 32,592 27,274
Log-
likelihood
-606,520 -235,480 -299,250 -79,558 -332,790 -276,630
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
∗Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 ∗∗Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01
Table 4: Estimated Parameters
diﬀerence between actual and expected consumption is high – that is, users choose suboptimal plans (at
least ex-post). This is consistent with the prior literature (Miravette, 2000). The intrinsic association
between satiation points in the two services is signiﬁcantly positively related (ρ = 0.83). That is, a
heavy user of one service is likely to be the heavy user of the other service regardless of substitution
or complementary eﬀect. This suggests that controlling for the intrinsic association of two services is
important for an unbiased estimate on the cross eﬀects of two services.
The ﬁrst three rows are the price response structural parameters. One of our key interests is the
cross-eﬀect estimate on bint. The sign of bint is negative and it is statistically signiﬁcant. The estimate
is consistently negative across all demographic segments. This provides an evidence that voice and SMS
form a substitutive relationship in our data. The negative and signiﬁcant estimate indicates that: (1)
the real consumption levels, which we can observe, are lower than the satiation points, which we cannot
see, in both services, (2) the optimal consumption of voice (or SMS) decreases as the consumption of the
other service goes up because the consumption in one service partially satisﬁes the satiation points in
the other service. The estimates on bq and bs are also sensible and signiﬁcant. Since the estimated bq
is signiﬁcantly greater than bs, it seems to suggest that the voice consumption is more sensitive to price
change.
We next split the data based on demographic factors (age and gender) and analyze the diﬀerence in the
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key parameter estimates across sub-groups. The results are shown from column 3 to column 7. Both price
response parameters are signiﬁcant in all groups though their magnitudes varies across groups. Younger
users, on average, have higher estimated mean consumption in both services (μq, μs) consistent with the
raw distribution of data. However, we also ﬁnd a stronger substitution eﬀect (bigger bint in an absolute
value) in the younger group than in the older group. Interestingly, there is less intrinsic correlation (ρ)
between voice and SMS for older users than younger ones. Females are more likely to consume more SMS
than males and have a higher estimated substitution eﬀect. Also, notice that estimated ρ for males is
much smaller than females.
The estimated values of bq, bs, and bint do not provide a clear picture of diﬀerences across groups.
We now discuss the implication of bint as well as the two price response parameters by calculating own-
and cross-price elasticities.
5.1 Own- and cross-price elasticities
To understand the true economic signiﬁcance of estimated parameters, we calculate own- and cross-price
elasticities using the estimates of bq, bs, and bint. Since we need marginal prices for both voice and
SMS to estimate elasticities, and a user experiences the marginal price of voice only if the user is in
region R3k, we use the demand Equation (5) in region R
3
k for estimating elasticities. Straightforward
manipulation of the equation leads to the own-price elasticity of voice as Eq = −3bq
/
q(1 − b2intbsbq)
and the own-price elasticity of SMS as Es = −3bs
/
s(1 − b2intbsbq). The cross-price elasticity of voice
with SMS (% changes in voice consumption in response to % change in SMS price) can be calculated by
Eq,s = −3bintbqbs
/
q(1− b2intbsbq) and the cross-price elasticity of SMS with voice can be calculated by
Es,q = −3bintbqbs
/
s(1− b2intbsbq).
Recall that our demand curves are linear and, therefore, the elasticities depend on quantities. Put
another way, the reaction to proportional price changes will be diﬀerent depending on the quantities
consumed. This is the reason we can not directly infer the magnitude of substitution by just looking
at the estimate for bint. Also, note that the cross price elasticities diﬀer due to scaling. People use
signiﬁcantly large number of voice minutes as opposed to number of SMS. Since we observe the change
in the marginal price of voice in our data (SMS prices remain unchanged) we will predominantly focus
on the elasticity of SMS with voice (Es,q). Below in Table 5, we report the elasticities at the mean values
for voice and SMS consumption. Given the signs of the estimated parameters, the own-price elasticities
are negative and the cross price elasticities are positive.
We start with the cross-price elasticities. The elasticity of SMS with voice is estimated to be small
with a magnitude of about about 0.08. Roughly this suggests that if the price of marginal voice minutes
increases by 100%, the SMS consumption will increase by about 8%. Put another way, if the price of
marginal minutes were to increase from 3 to 6, the number of SMS will increase by one message to about
14 messages (mean number of SMS is about 13, an 8% increase translates to about one message). Low
values of cross-price elasticities suggest that while SMS acts as a substitute for voice, the magnitude
of this substitution is low. It seems that the users in our sample view voice and SMS as diﬀerentiated
services which serve to diﬀerent applications and needs. Therefore, a choice to send a SMS does not
signiﬁcantly diminish the need to make a voice call and vice-versa.
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Mean-usage price elasticities
Whole Sample
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 285 Eq = -0.085 Es,q = 0.078
SMS 13 Es = -0.030 Eq,s = 0.003
Users with Age < 30
Voice 330 -0.052 0.032
SMS 17 -0.011 0.001
30 ≤ Age < 40
Voice 265 -0.114 0.116
SMS 10 -0.028 0.004
Age ≥ 40
Voice 204 -0.161 0.188
SMS 8 -0.053 0.007
Female
Voice 287 -0.085 0.041
SMS 14 -0.009 0.002
Male
Voice 274 -0.102 0.092
SMS 10 -0.033 0.003
Plan 1
Voice 249 -0.097 0.100
SMS 10 -0.039 0.004
Plan 2
Voice 643 -0.037 0.026
SMS 39 -0.010 0.001
Plan 3
Voice 1011 -0.023 0.022
SMS 44 -0.009 0.001
Plan 4
Voice 1556 -0.015 0.023
SMS 43 -0.009 0.0006
Plan 5
Voice 1994 -0.012 0.036
SMS 28 -0.014 0.0005
Table 5: Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities
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The estimated own-price elasticities are small. The low values of own-price elasticities of voice and
SMS suggest that users do not respond to price changes very aggressively (at least at the mean values).
The numbers suggest that a 100% increase in the price of voice minutes would lead to about 8.5%
reduction in demand. Thus if price of voice minutes were to increase to 4 from 3 (a 33% increase), on
average it would lead to a reduction of about 8 minutes. Low own-price elasticities are consistent with
the previous research on land-line telephony usage. The price elasticities of ﬁxed line demand in previous
studies range from -0.1 to -0.5. Garbacz and Thompson (2003) report that the demand for local service
is highly inelastic (-0.006 to -0.011). Park et al. (1983) use random experimental data and report that
elasticity is about -0.1 in absolute value. Kling and Ploeg (1990) show that the price elasticity of ﬁxed
phone service is in the range of -0.1. Andersson (2006) report low own price elasticity for mobile telephony
(about -0.2). Generally, users exhibit low elasticity to more necessary services. The low number could be
a reﬂection of the fact that mobile services are increasingly becoming necessary to users. In fact, in many
countries, mobiles phones are becoming the only communication device users retain. Thus low elasticities
could be the manifestation of these changing structures.
SMS service is far less elastic than voice service. This could be due to the relatively small consumption
level – the price elasticity is calculated with not only price response parameters but also average usage
(the average of SMS consumption is around 11 messages). That is, consumers are likely to be satiated
with a relatively small number of messages and might respond to the marginal price of SMS service far
less than that of voice service.
At ﬁrst blush, the low elasticity levels seem inconsistent with a familiar result from the neoclassical
theory of the ﬁrm that a ﬁrm does not set prices in a region of its demand where the elasticity is less than
one. However, there are a number of reasons why this is not so. First, the elasticity we are measuring
is not the elasticity relevant to the standard result. Consumers might respond to an increase in our
ﬁrm’s prices both by reducing minutes consumed and by substituting to the products of other ﬁrms. The
standard result applies to the sum of these two eﬀects, and we examine only the former of the two. It is
easy to imagine the latter eﬀect being the larger of the two. Another way of saying this is that we are
not measuring the residual elasticity facing the ﬁrm (what the standard theory is about) but the market
elasticity of the consumers who happen to have chosen this ﬁrm. Second, the standard result applies only
to static models: in a setting with stickiness in demand or other interesting dynamics, the result need
not apply, and ﬁrms may price at an inelastic point.
The results show that the price elasticities are diﬀerent across age-based and gender-based segmented
groups. The ﬁndings of a big variation in price elasticities across individual demographic proﬁles could
be informative for practical managerial implication. First, we ﬁnd that the younger users are, on average,
more inelastic than the older group for both the own and the cross-price elasticity. We do not have
information regarding individual income. But, it is generally believed that the older users have a higher
income and they are expected to be more inelastic to price change. Therefore, this is somewhat counter-
intuitive and provides some insight in understanding mobile service. It could be that the parents are
paying the bills for youngsters and that reduces their elasticity, or that the young users perceive mobile
services as more necessary than the older users. Since the older users are more elastic, we conclude that
when the marginal cost of SMS increases, the older users are more likely to change the communication
tool from SMS to voice than the younger users.
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The Female users are more inelastic than the male users in both services. And the cross-price elasticity
of voice in the female group is half that of the male group. Thus, it suggests that men are more likely to
consider SMS as a substitute to voice than women.
Given our linear demand curve, the variation of own- and cross-price elasticities across plans is rea-
sonable. As users select a higher plan, they show less sensitive price response behavior. This is to be
expected as the average consumption is increasing in plans.
5.2 Alternative evidence of substitution eﬀect
One key goal of this paper is to identify the interaction of voice and SMS. We explained the details of
our identiﬁcation strategy behind bint earlier. However, in a structural framework, there may be worries
that nonlinearities in the likelihood function are driving identiﬁcation. To provide more robustness to
our analysis, we now provide a more intuitive evidence of how SMS is a substitute for voice.
First, note that when users’ voice consumption is below the free quota in their selected plans, users
face zero marginal cost for voice but positive marginal cost for SMS. Once they exceed the free minutes,
the voice minutes also incur a marginal cost. Thus, if SMS is a substitute (or complement), we should
expect a signiﬁcant jump (drop) in the SMS consumption when the free quota is exceeded. The free quota
for plan 1 is 350 minutes. Thus a user exceeding 350 minutes in plan 1 would pay for voice minutes.
However, a user who signs up in plan 2 would not worry about the 350 minute limit as the free quota
limit for plan 2 is 517 minutes. Therefore, we compare the user group in plan 1 with the user group in
plan 2 and see how the SMS consumption changes when users exceed 350 minutes in both plans. More
precisely we run the following regression, where i indexes users and t indexes time:
SMSit = β0 + β1qit + β2DFQk + β3(qit − FQk)+ + εit (10)
where,
DFQk = 1 if qit ≥ FQk, otherwise 0.
(qit − FQk)+ = qit − FQk if qit ≥ FQk, otherwise 0.
DFQk captures the jump (drop) in SMS consumption before and after the free quota (or incurring
a marginal cost per minute). Thus a positive and signiﬁcant estimate on this dummy for plan 1 users
should provide the evidence of substitution eﬀect. We report the results of this regression in Table 6.
We run the regression for users selecting plan 1 and for users selecting plan 2. We conﬁrm from Table
6 that there is an abrupt increase of SMS consumption at the kinked point (of 350 minutes) in only the
user group selecting plan 1 (notice the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (p = 5%) of dummy DFQk only for the plan
1 users but not for plan 2).
Figure 4 captures this jump in SMS consumption around the free quota boundary. SMS consumption
increases with voice (positive correlation) but the jump in SMS consumption around free quota provides
a strong evidence of a substitutive relationship between voice and SMS.
We ﬁnd the same results when considering the individual ﬁxed eﬀect. We tested the same model
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User Group selecting Plan 1 User Group selecting Plan 2
Voice 0.01∗∗
(0.001)
0.12**
(0.06)
DFQk 1.03
∗∗
(0.54)
2.55
(7.2)
(Voice-350)+ 0.013∗∗
(0.002)
-0.12
(0.06)
Constant 6.97∗∗
(0.38)
-4.26∗∗
(15.66)
N 56634 2103
Standard errors are shown in parentheses
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05
Table 6: Substitution eﬀect of SMS for voice service
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Figure 4: Evidence of substitutive relationship of voice and SMS
in the narrower range of voice consumption: qi = [150, 550]. The dummy is still signiﬁcant, providing
robust support for substitution eﬀect. In summary, we believe that the substitution eﬀect identiﬁed in
our structural model is robust and consistent with our data.
5.3 Policy Experiments
A key advantage of a structural model is that one can perform policy experiments and a “what-if”
analysis. That is, we can analyze what happens to a ﬁrm’s demand and hence revenue (or proﬁt) “if the
ﬁxed fee increases by 1%” or “if the ﬁrm decreases the free quota by 1%.” One of the goals of this paper
is also to provide some actionable recommendations to managers. Thus conducting policy experiments
provides useful information regarding the impact of change on the ﬁrm’s revenues as well as proﬁtability.
It should be noted that the nonlinear pricing and the kinked budget line make the interpretation
of estimates diﬃcult. In particular, a change in any of the key strategic (decision) variables cannot be
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analyzed in isolation because the change likely causes multiple changes in consumers’ plan choice and
consumption behavior. As a result, estimating price elasticity alone is not suﬃcient enough to highlight
the impact of prices on consumer demand. For example, the change in the marginal cost of voice minutes
will not only aﬀect the demand for users consuming marginal minutes (region R3k) but will also force
more users on kink point R2k. Therefore, the change will potentially aﬀect the plan choice probability as
well – i.e., a unit price increase in voice for a plan can impact the proﬁtability of every plan. Thus the
change in marginal price of voice or SMS within or across plans is likely to have indirect eﬀect on the
demand for all other plans and the associated consumption level.
Moreover, another key strategic variable available to the ﬁrm is the ﬁxed fee of every plan. Similarly,
the ﬁrm can increase or decrease the number of free minutes available in each plan. Since the ﬁxed fee (or
free minutes conditional on each plan) does not vary in our data, the impact of changes in ﬁxed fee can
not be readily estimated. But, our policy experiment based on a structural model outlined in our paper
allows us to estimate the impact of a change in all the strategic variables more completely by simulating
various counterfactual possibilities. Again, this analysis provides substantial advantages over a reduced
form model.
We perform various simulations. In particular, we examine how changes in the strategic variables aﬀect
the ﬁrm’s revenue. Note that we outline only the impact on ﬁrm revenues. However, any other metrics
such as probability of plan choice, or changes in demand can also be readily calculated. The strategic
variables we manipulate are : (1) change in the marginal price of voice and SMS, both separately and
simultaneously, (2) change in the ﬁxed fee, and (3) change in the free quota minutes.
To carry out this exercise, we randomly generate around 5000 of (θiqt, θist) based on the estimated
distribution-related parameters for policy experiments. Table 7 shows the plan choice distributions of
both the generated data and the collected data, indicating that the model ﬁts the data reasonably well.
That is, the structural parameters are consistent with our large sample, and thus the data generated for
the experiments are well representative of the “real world” data we collected.
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5
Data randomly generated 0.96% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Data collected 0.95% 0.04 % 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 7: Plan choice distribution
The ﬁrst exercise is simply aimed at evaluating the eﬀect of change in strategic variables without
consideration of consumer diﬀerentiation across demographic segments. We calculated, for each gener-
ated (θiqt, θist), the optimal plan choice and subsequently the optimal consumptions of both services.
Given that, we can compute the ﬁrm’s revenue from the expected consumption behaviors. We can then
recalculate the revenues by changing any strategic variable. The upper part of Table 8 shows the change
of revenue derived from “one unit change” of every strategic variable. But, a unit increase in the marginal
price of voice is not directly comparable to a unit increase in the ﬁxed fee due to scaling. Another possi-
bility is to consider “%” change in the prices. However, a 10% change in the marginal price of the voice is
not the same as a 10% change in the ﬁxed fee. To keep the comparisons reasonable, we let the marginal
prices of voice and SMS to change by 10% and the prices of ﬁxed fee and volume of free quota to change
25
by 5%.12
Users can respond to the change of the pricing scheme either by reducing the consumption level or
by leaving the ﬁrm (i.e., switching mobile operators or giving up mobile communication). In order to
incorporate the hypothetical defection behavior, we assume that consumers leave the ﬁrm when their
surplus (utility level) from the mobile service goes below a certain threshold. To set this threshold,
we rank order consumer surplus. The threshold is set at the lowest surplus level. As we change the
parameters, if a consumer’s surplus falls below the threshold, we consider the consumer leave the ﬁrm.
We applied this condition to all policy experiments we performed.13 However, it must be noted that we
cannot systematically and fully specify consumers’ defection behavior in our policy experiments because
of lack of detailed data.14
One unit change of strategic variables
One unit MP
increase in
both Services
One unit MP
increase in
voice
One unit MP
increase in
SMS
One unit
Fixed Fee
increase
One minute
Free Minute
Decrease
Revenues
Increase
2.94% 0.87% 2.06% 0.12% 0.15%
Normalized unit change of strategic variables
10% MP
increase in
voice
10% MP in-
crease in SMS
5% Fixed Fee
increase
5% Free
Minute De-
crease
Revenue
Increase
0.26% 0.62% 3.8% 3.1%
Table 8: Simulation of change of unit pricing scheme
Compared to change in the marginal price of both services, change in the ﬁxed fee (or free quota)
has far greater impact on the ﬁrm’s revenue. This is consistent with our general expectation. A change
in the ﬁxed fee or the free quota aﬀects all consumers by increasing their ﬁxed cost. However, change in
the marginal cost of voice has little eﬀect on the users not exceeding the given free quota – according to
the data, only one third of the observations (20,346) incur marginal costs across all plan. Further, the
results suggest that a decrease of free minutes can increase revenue, but the most eﬀective strategy is to
increase the ﬁxed fee somewhat. A change in the marginal price of SMS service has a bigger inﬂuence
on the revenue than a change in the marginal price of voice. At a glance, this is inconsistent with the
inference from the calculated price elasticities of demand. But the results are attributed to the diﬀerence
of average consumption levels, which we highlighted earlier.
12One could potentially calculate the equivalent ﬁxed fee increase or free quota decrease for a unit price increase in
marginal voice minute. Based on the usage, individual users consume 39.75 additional voice minutes beyond the given free
quota. A user pay an average price of 1.023 units for a voice minute. Therefore, one unit marginal price increase in the
price of a voice minute is equivalent to increasing the ﬁxed fee by 38.85 units or decreasing the free minutes quotes by
about 39.75 minutes. Similarly, the average consumption of SMS is 11.8, one unit increase of per minute marginal price for
voice is comparable to about 0.296 unit increase of per message marginal price. We performed our simulations with this
alternative speciﬁcation as well and results are comparable. They are available upon request from authors.
13This approach is based on the assumption of cardinal utility and enables us to incorporate the negative repercussions
of the change of strategic variables in the policy experiments. For example, the price change such as the increase of ﬁxed
fee would make the mobile services more unattractive, at least for the users with low (θiqt, θist).
14We essentially outline only small price changes and one would expect that for the small price changes, consumers’
defection probability is small. Thus, for small price changes, we treat the ﬁrm as a monopolist. So the policy experiments
suggest how the change of pricing scheme will aﬀect the direction of revenues.
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We further perform policy experiments across diﬀerent demographic groups. We generated (θiqt, θist)
separately in every group based on the estimated parameters of the corresponding groups. Table 9 shows
distinct diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the changes of strategic variables across demographic segments as well
as across selected plans.
10% MP
increase in
voice
10% MP in-
crease in SMS
5% Fixed Fee
increase
5% Free
Minute De-
crease
Age<30
Revenue Increase 0.61% 0.94% 3.3% 4%
30≤Age <40
Revenue Increase 0.17% 0.44% 3.80% 2.91%
Age≥40
Revenue Increase 0.10% 0.55% 3.50% 1.84%
Female
Revenue Increase 0.08% 1.07% 3.80% 1.54%
Male
Revenue Increase 0.70% 0.60% 3.80% 2.92%
Plan 1
Revenue Increase 3.65% 2.92%
Plan 2
Revenue Increase 0.14% 0.16%
When conducting policy experiments in every segment, we generate (θiqt, θist) based on
the estimated parameters of the corresponding groups.
Table 9: Policy experiment across Demographic groups and plans
The eﬀect of change in the marginal prices is far higher in younger users (Age < 30) than in older
users (Age > 30), consistent with their calculated price elasticities. In particular, it is noticeable that
the eﬀect of an increase in the marginal price of voice is greater in younger users than in the others by
around 6 times. We conjecture from this ﬁndings that younger users are more likely to incur marginal
cost than older users.
A change in the marginal prices or the free minutes is more eﬀective in younger users than in older
users while an increase in the ﬁxed fee is the best strategy for older users. The simulation shows that
the eﬀect of change in the free minute is greatest in the younger user group. However, interestingly, the
eﬀect of the ﬁxed fee increase is smallest in younger users. As a result, the ﬁrm can increase its revenue
with by changing the ﬁxed fee for older user group than changing any other strategic variable. Younger
users are likely to use as much free minutes available and thus the decrease of free minutes turns out to
be the most eﬀective tool to increase revenue for that group.
Comparing the price-elasticities between male and female groups, we found female users are more
inelastic than male users in both services. However, the simulation shows that change in the marginal
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price for voice is more eﬀective for males while change in the marginal price of SMS is more eﬀective
for females. Thus, this result suggests that our policy experiments provide more useful information by
accommodating the multiple changes caused by changing one variable.
Another exercise is to compare the impact of the changes in the ﬁxed fee or the free quota across
available plans. We increase (decrease) the ﬁxed fee (free quota) of a selected plan by leaving the other
plans unchanged. The simulation shows that an increase in the ﬁxed fee is the most eﬀective strategy to
increase revenues as shown in the lower part of Table 8. Majority of users select plan 1 or plan 2 and
thus eﬀects of change in the ﬁxed fee (or the free minutes) in other plans are ignored.
5.4 Discussion and implications of our ﬁndings
Our results oﬀer two clear implications and contributions. The ﬁrst contribution is academic. We oﬀer a
method to estimate own- and cross-price elasticities in the context of nonlinear tariﬀs involving two goods.
Nonlinear tariﬀs are oﬀered in many settings and most popularly in the wireless telephony. Firms are also
increasingly oﬀering multiple services. Due to complexity of tariﬀs, the customer usage data available
to ﬁrms and researchers is also complex. This precludes use of simple demand estimates. Despite the
complexity of data, ﬁrms still need to tease out how multiple services interact and how elastic consumers
are to prices. We believe that our paper extends the literature and provides a framework to analyze such
data in a rigorous but tractable fashion. As the wireless market evolves and other 3G (third generation)
data services become routine (e.g., web browsing), our model can be extended to incorporate additional
services and their interactive eﬀect on voice and SMS.
In a similar fashion, our results have implications for ﬁrms oﬀering a bundle of multiple services.
Firms are increasingly oﬀering bundled services and applications to users, especially in cellular markets.
Bundling is used for price discrimination, increasing customer loyalty, as well as introducing new services.
However, bundling multiple services also requires careful understanding of how those services interact.
When introducing a new service, ﬁrms tend to give them away at no cost by bundling them with ex-
isting services. New services thus can be diﬀused eﬀectively. However, such bundling requires careful
considerations of whether the services are signiﬁcant substitutes. If the services are complements or
even independent, then such strategies can be highly eﬀective (Andersson 2006). Otherwise, signiﬁcant
popularity of substitutive services oﬀered at a lower price can have large cannibalization impact on key
revenue earning services of a ﬁrm.
Table 10 shows the results of the policy experiments regarding bundling strategy of voice and SMS. As
the estimated substitutive relationship between two services indicates, the provision of “free” SMS cannot
increase the consumption of voice whereas the free SMS decreases the consumption of voice. Therefore,
the bundling of voice and free SMS reduces the ﬁrm’s revenues.
Bundling of voice and free SMS
The number of free SMS 1 2 3 4 5 10
Revenue Change -0.36% -0.71% -1.04% -1.36% -1.66% -2.99%
Table 10: Policy experiment regarding bundling of voice and SMS
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Moving forward, these issues are going to be critical for ﬁrms as cellular platforms increasingly oﬀer
multiple services and applications, sometime provided by third parties. Availability of multiple services
and applications tend to increase the value of a cellular platform. However, they can also compete directly
with the ﬁrm’s own services. Understanding how a new application or a service would interact with the
ﬁrm’s portfolio will be critical for a platform’s proﬁtability. This is one of the reasons a ﬁrm like Apple,
for a long time, explicitly prohibited users from downloading VoIP applications (like Skype) on their
iPhones which directly cannibalizes its voice services. Currently, iPhone and “Google Voice” are engaged
in a similar battle. We believe that our model provides a useful framework to analyze these situations
which are going to be increasingly commonplace.
Finally and more importantly, our results have useful managerial implications. As we pointed out,
complexity of nonlinear tariﬀs also make it diﬃcult to interpret how changes in key strategic variables
such as marginal cost or ﬁxed fee would impact ﬁrm demand and hence proﬁtability. As outlined in Table
8, 9, and 10, our policy experiments provide a useful decision support to the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, our results
can be used to design optimal tariﬀs by utilizing the results of the policy experiment. Given the user
heterogeneity in our data set – most of the users have selected plan 1 –, the ﬁrm could have potentially
exploited user heterogeneity better by oﬀering more plans at the lower level. Considering everything, our
results suggest that the ﬁrm’s current tariﬀ structure is potentially sub-optimal.
6 Conclusion, limitation and further research direction
Our paper seeks to examine the interaction of voice and SMS services provided by a wireless operators.
The tariﬀ structure oﬀered by the operator is nonlinear and the customer decision making is sequential
(choice of a plan ﬁrst and the consumption amounts of voice and SMS later). Moreover, customers
consumes both voice and SMS conditional on a plan choice. We start by specifying a utility structure
and derive consumer demand for these services. Our framework accounts for endogeneity of plan choice
and subsequent consumptions. Thus, our model provides an estimable structure which takes into account
the unique nature of wireless demand. We estimate the model with a unique and rich individual-level
consumption dataset, which has detailed information on each consumer’s plan choice and then subsequent
consumption quantities for voice and SMS. Using the data, we estimate, among other parameters, the
cross-price eﬀects of voice and SMS. Our model accounts for customer heterogeneity in terms of their
inherent preference for voice and SMS.
Our results show that voice and SMS services are Marshallian substitutes. However the magnitude
of substitution is small. We ﬁnd that, on average, the cross-price elasticity of voice and SMS is low and
about -0.08. That is a 10% increase in the price of voice minutes would lead to about 0.8% increase in
SMS consumption. We also estimate the own-price elasticity of voice and SMS. We ﬁnd that the own-
price elasticity of voice is about -0.085 while the own-price elasticity of SMS (though it is not identiﬁed
directly) is about -0.030. The low estimated elasticity for voice is comparable to what researcher have
found in the land-line telephony studies (low price elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.2). We also ﬁnd
that in many cases, consumers who prefer higher levels of voice consumption also have preference for
SMS consumption. In short, there is a strong inherent correlation between these services(ρ = 0.83). We
highlight how controlling for this inherent preference is important for estimating the cross eﬀects. To test
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the robustness of our identiﬁcation, we also perform an intuitive regression analysis. The regression uses
the change in voice service’s marginal price once the user exceeds the allowable free minutes of a selected
plan. The estimates from the regression exercise conﬁrm the substitutive relationship of voice and SMS.
We also explore how user sensitivity varies depending on demographic characteristics. We ﬁnd that
older users are more price-sensitive in both services as well as exhibit higher cross-price elasticity. We
ﬁnd that there is little diﬀerence between the consumption patterns of males and females compared to
age-based segmented groups. The extent of substitution eﬀect and price elasticity somewhat depends on
users’ demographic factors. We then conduct some counterfactual policy experiments to examine how
changes in key strategic variables aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁtability. We outline how our model allows us to estimate
these eﬀects. The last point is particularly important because the contribution of this paper goes beyond
the rich dataset we have collected. It is also the structural model we build that allows us to identify and
estimate key elasticity parameters that otherwise would not be possible with a na¨ıve reduced form model.
Thus our methodology provides us with insights into consumer behavior that otherwise would escape us.
Thus, our research provides interesting avenues for future research in an important and growing ﬁeld of
cellular voice and data communication.
While the richness of the data is a key strength, it is not without limitations. We do not have detailed
information on consumer (disposable) income. Therefore, our analytical framework doesn’t reﬂect on how
individual users allocate their monthly budget to mobile communication and outside goods. In reality,
users are expected to make decisions of budget allocation by comparing the utility from mobile service
and that from others. We cannot accommodate this feature in our model. Our data is also limited to
one ﬁrm. In particular, the own-price and the cross-price elasticities should be interpreted with caution
due to lack of competitor data. Similarly, our results should be interpreted as conditional on ﬁrm choice.
Therefore, our measure is focused on only the consumer consumption reduction behavior to price increase
– this limited research view is partly applied to the counterfactual policy experiments we conducted. Our
data also lacks variation in SMS pricing making the estimates on price elasticity of SMS less credible. Our
model also employs speciﬁc functional forms for the utility structure and assumes distributional forms for
various parameters. While many of these assumptions are widely used in literature, our results should
be interpreted appropriately.
Our current work is focused on Voice and SMS in mobile service. As we outline in the discussion
section, wireless operators are increasingly oﬀering multiple applications and services. Future work should
analyze more prominent data services like WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) or application usage.
Our model also ignores the network externalities. This would be another promising area to explore. We
believe our paper takes a step in this direction and informs readers of the challenges of data in a complex
setting and the models needed to analyze such data to provide insights into this market.
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